There seems to me to be no other economist with wftose general way of thinking I feel myself in such genuine accord.
In this view, relevant theory is not a compendium of propositions derived from axioms assumed to be universally true: economic theory is not a subdivision of mathematics. Relevant theory is the result of the exercise of imagination and logical powers on observations that are due to experience: it yields propositions about the operation of an actual economy. The current methodological fashion, where artificial economies are first specified, then simulated and finally deemed satisfactory (unsatisfactory) if it can be said that the general characteristics of the simulation are similar (dissimilar) to the general characteristics of a time series of constructs based upon observations (such as GNP), would most certainly have been anathema to both Keynes and to the institutionalists of his day [Montgomery 1994 ]. In today's tenninology, Keynes's "beliefs" are mental models that lead to propositiotis about the behavior of the "real world" economy. This approach makes "real world" outcomes dependent upon institutions. It sanctions state interventions to create institutions that lead to an economy with desirable properties. The last act of Keynes's life was his deep involvement in the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Ftmd. Much earlier he proposed itistitutions that would create what today we tnight call "capitalism with a hutnan face," which obviously was the aim of the great itistitutionalists.Î propose to take up four topics:
1. The link between the position of Keynes, in A Treatise on Probability [1921] , on the nature of inference in the creation of beliefs and the contemporary view, as exemplified by Thomas J. Sargent in Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics [1993] , about the models that enter into decisions once the boundedness of rationality is acknowledged. By accepting that agents need to leam the model of the economy they use in decision makitig and that the complexity of economic processes and the time consuming nature of learning meatis that the agents are never sure of the validity of the models they use, the new classical economists have moved toward Keynes's views about uncertainty in A Treatise in Probability. Uncertainty viewed as the result of the degree of rational belief in the models that underlie action is central to those parts of JTie General Theory in which the determination of the prices of capital and financial assets and of liability structures for financing positions in capital and financial assets are taken up. Thus, a convergence has taken place between the views about uncertainty between the new classical economics and the economics of JTie General Theory that focuses upon the need for the full integration of financial and monetary relations in determining what bappens in a capitalist economy. 2. Capitalism in the United States is now in a new stage, "money tnanager capitalism, " in which the proximate owners of a vast proportion of financial instruments are mutual and pension funds. The total retiun on the portfolio is the only criteria used for judging the performance of the managers of these funds, which translates into an emphasis upon the bottom line in the management of business organizations. It makes the long view a luxury that only companies that are essentially owned by a single individual and that are not deeply dependent upon extemal financing can afford. 3. Public tolerance for uncertainty is limited. The New Deal restmcttiring of capitalism created itistitutions that contained uncertainty. The evolution of the economy has decreased the effectiveness of the New Deal reforms, and money manger capitalism has radically increased tmcertainty. The creation of new economic institutions that constrain the impact of uncertainty is necessary. 4. I conclude with some thoughts about measures that may constrain the insecurity bred by the attenuation of the effectiveness of the New Deal structures along with the heightened uncertainty due to money manager capitalism.
Uncertmnty
By the time he wrote The General Theory, Keynes was a "man of the City" as well as an academic economist. The fmancing of activity and of positions in capital assets, as collected in firtns, were central to his thinking. Business investment in inventory and durable capital assets require extemal financing from banks, other financial institutions, or the floating of bonds or shares. This need for extemal finance imposes a negotiating process between bankers and business people. This forces agents to acknowledge that ignorance and conjecture enter decisions to create and finance capital assets whose value, once they are in place, depends upon the markets' view of their prospective returns over a long horizon. The uncertainty that permeates the economics of Keynes and the economics of botmded rationality is due to the unsureness about the validity of the model of the economy that enters in the decision process. Action involves a suspension of disbelief by both sides in the negotiatiotis, and economic success fosters such a suspetision.
Government institution building can be interpreted as adding dimensions to the economy whose behaviors are not as uncertain as that of market-determined variables. The Bank of England's discount window may well be the paradigm for institution creation that substituted certainty for uncertainty [Mitisky 1957] . The core countries of the capitalist world have not had a big depression in the 50 years since the end of World War II. Big govenunent provides insurance against an utter collapse of profit flows and asset prices such as happened between 1929 and 1933. In Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics., Tom Sargent accepts the critique of rational expectations that holds that the agents in the model have to leam the model that they use in decision making. The "bounded ratiotiality" of the agents means that at any moment of time there is no assurance that the agents are acting on the basis of muttially consistent models such as are needed for the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. In Sargent's argument, "bounded rationality" means that the agents in the economy are unsure about the degree of rational belief that is warranted in the model that they use at any time to guide their action.
Thus, in Sargent's artificial world, intractable uncertainty is pervasive because the agents in the model need to leam the properties of the model from experience. The self-seeking agents are uncertain (or unstire) in their knowledge of the economy and they accept that others are also unsure. In practice, Sargent's work aims to extract systemic consistency relations out of situations where uncertainty rules. He ignores an aspect of decision making tinder uncertainty that Keynes emphasized: the elements determining long-term expectations change so often that what happetis in the economy at any date will be contaminated by market conditions that reflect actions determined by mental models tbat differ from the model that now guides expectation formation and therefore actiotis.
With the acceptance of boimded rationality, the new classical economics has moved toward an essential atialytical aspect of the economics of Keynes: bounded rationality is a different type of beast than the rationality of rational expectations. Both the economics of Keynes and frontier neoclassical macroeconomic theory allow that agents need to extract the models of the economy that guide their actions out of their experience and their observations of the "world." Because the agents drawing inferences differ in their place in the economy, their history, and their ability to generalize and abstract, the models that guide decisions any time are likely to differ: the models are likely to be inconsistent.
Uncertainty (or unsureness) is a deep property of decentralized systems in which a myriad of independent agents make decisions whose impacts are aggregated into outcomes that emerge over a range of tomorrows. Uncertainty about what the outcomes will be follows from the uncertainty with which agents hold the model that guides their actions. Agents are not otily utisure about the validity of the model that guides their actions, they impute such uncertainty to the other actors in the economy. In the modem world, where govemments intervene by way of fiscal and central bank actions, agents in the model impute this same uncertainty about the true nature of the world to the policy agents of the govenunent [Papadimitriou and Wray 1994] .
It is now clear that the power of the rational expectations/new classical macroeconomic revolution was derived from the heroic specification of the model that agents use to guide decisions, rather than upon the proposition that agents use "all" of the available information in making decisions where "all information" takes the form of models (theories) of how the world behaves. The heroic specification was that all agents have a common imderstanditig of the environment within which they operate and that in this commonly understood envirotunent the effect of agents seek-ing their own good sustains a general equilibrium. The asstimption of the rationality of expectatiotis takes the role of Smith's "invisible hand" in assuring that equilibrium exists and that the commotily understood environment is logically equivalent to the unsatisfactory assumption of perfect foresight in general equilibrium theory.
In both the Keynesian and the new classical economics of bounded rationality, the prior history of every agent includes a process by which agents learn the model of the model they use in making decisions. It is therefore difficult to see how the requirement for rational expectations equilibrium-that all agents in the model at all times have the identical, or at least a consistent, model of the model-can be satisfied. When leaming processes are taken into account the models being used to make decisions at any (every) today are always provisional: they never can be certain final models.
If rational agents doubt the validity of the model that currently guides their actions, then they stand ready to abandon that model as the behavior of the economy produces data that disaffirms the model. Whenever a model with a weak degree of belief guides the actions of an agent, as evidence accrues, initial models are likely to be abandoned and a new set substituted. When this happens, sharp changes in the behavior of agents and of the economy are likely to occur.
Although Keynes and the boimded rationality approaches to uncertainty are similar, fundamental differences remain. One is in the priors of the theorist. Keynes aimed to develop a theory of an economy in which, because of its structure, money cannot be neutral. He achieved this by dividing prices into those which are domitiated by the need to recover costs and those which are determined by the value placed upon future income flows. The fonner cotisisted of the current outputs of current consumption and investment goods, and the latter consisted of the prices of the outstanding fmancial and capital assets.T he bounded rationality approach retains the assumption that preference systems are over the reals and that outputs and relative prices can be determined independently of monetary and financial variables. The impact of nomitial values and fitiancial relatiotis are only of transitory significance.
The Keynesian vision imposes a structure on spending. Consumption and investment spending are different because households consume and firms (or businesses) invest. A modem capitalist economy is structured so that the capital assets of the economy are owned by firms that are orgatiized as corporations, firtns finance control over these assets by liabilities, and directly or through intermediaries households own these liabilities. A premise of Keynesian modelling is that the capitalist economy cannot be understood by splitting it into a real and a financial or monetary sector. Keynesian modelling holds that a basic aspect of the structure of capitalist economies is given by intenelated balance sheets, income statements, and the time series of cash flow commitments that are embodied in financial instruments.
Keynesian economics emphasizes decisiotis to undertake and finance investment. In skeletal versions, the pace of investment is viewed as calling the tune for both aggregate income and its distribution: distribution is viewed as being determined by the structure of demands, not by production function characteristics. In modern capitalist economies, complex corporate organizations struggle for tnarket power in order to get an edge in the competition for profits. In the neoclassical school, even in its most modem forms, it is not clear that the economy tmder analysis is capitalist.
The economics of Keynes is not a theory for all economies. It is a theory of capitalist economies: the economies for which Keynesian analysis is relevant have firms and these firms often have market power. The labehng of the volume The General Theory was stretching the use of langtiage.
Because of the recognition of uncertainty in the new botmded-rationality leaming models, a partial convergence between the economics of Keynes and tbe new classical econotnics has occurred. The differences have nanowed so that a fruitful discotirse may now be possible.
Money Manager Capitalism
Capitalism is an evolving and dynamic system that has come in many fortns and even now different forms coexist. For the United States, the financial stages of American capitalism can be characterized as: commercial capitalism; industrial capitalism and wild cat financing; financial capitalism and state financing; paternalistic, managerial, and welfare state capitalism; money manager capitalism.
It is enough to say that the evolution has been from a financial structure where extemal finance was mainly used for trade to a structure where there is ever greater use of extemal funds to finance the long-term capital development of the economy. Furthermore, with affiuence, the increase in life expectancy, and the well tiigh complete monetization of incomes, the ownership of financial assets has widened.
The Great Breakdown of 1929-33 led to widespread reforms of the financial structure. The premises underlying the New Deal restructuring of the American financial system were that the United States was henceforth to be a capitalist economy in which corporations were to be the dominant form of business organization and in which, in both financial markets and corporate govemance, the interests of the shareholders were to be dominant. To deal with such a system, a doctrine of transparency of both financial markets and corporate governance was developed. From 1933 through the end of World War II, the main extemal financing of activity was by the govemment. As the Levy-Kalecki relations show, massive govemment deficits lead to large-scale business profits. At the end of the war, a unique financial structure ruled. For the first time in history, a broad set of households owned financial assets mainly in the form of govemment debt or as instirance policies and bank deposits. These, in tum, were largely offset by govemment debt. Business indebtedness was minimal. Many of the great corp)oratiotis had large net positions in govemment debts.
Out of this initial position in 1946, money manager capitalism emerged. Characteristics of money matiager capitalism are 1. Almost all business is organized through corporations. 2. Dominant proportions of the liabilities of cor]X)rations are held either by financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, or by mutual and pension funds. 3. This involves the intmsion of a new layer of intermediation, by pension and mutual funds, into the financial structure. 4. Pension and mutual funds are bound only by contract as to what assets they can own and what activities they can engage in. 5. The stated aim of fund managers is to maximize the value of the investments of the holders of its liabilities. 6. The perfomiance of a fund and of fund managers is measured by the total retum on assets, which is given by the combination of dividends and interest received and the appreciation in per share value.
In seeking the tnaximum total retum, these funds have often provided the equity investment for highly leveraged buy outs of firms. In addition, because of their "commitment" to maximizing fiind holders' value, these funds are constrained to accept bids for their shares that are at a premium to current market values. They are essential for the environment in which corporate raiders and takeovers exist and in which the conveyance of the assets of the corporate entity to the those who take over or even threaten to take over can take place.
The pension and mutual funds have made business management especially sensitive to the cunent stock market valtiation of the firm. They are an essential ingredient in accentuation of the predatory nature of current American capitalism.
Money manager capitalism has led to a heightening of uncertainty at the firm and plant level; in particular, it has tnade the lot of middle management in firms more unsure. Historic pattems of firm paternalism have often tmravelled. There is an almost chronic need to downsize overhead and to seek the lowest possible variable cost.
A great cheapening of tratisport and communication costs has lowered the barriers protecting local production and increased the pressure on current operating costs to meet "foreign" costs. Even as the natural barriers to trade have decreased, the willingness and ability of management to accept lower profit margins to sustain domestic production has vanished. These factors have decreased the assurance of continued employment by blue-collar, white-collar and middle-management personnel.
Although the aggregate perfomiance of the economy is not bad, individual security has diminished.
Social Limits to the Tolerance for Uncertainty
The tolerance for uncertainty is limited. The well-known insurance phenomenon, in which users willingly take an unfair bet in order protect thetnselves against large contingent losses, can be extended to the domain of the utiinsurable: imcertainty. When uncertainty leads to an unsatisfactory result, then it becomes the duty of society in general to protect its citizens against the consequences: a sacrifice of narrow technical efficiency may be called for.
New Deal institutional innovatiotis were designed to attenuate if not to eliminate uncertainty. In some cases, this had very positive consequences. The agricultural programs set floors to prices and provided "crop insurance": these measures had the effect of setting floors to fanner's incomes. In tum, this fioor made farmers signatures at banks "good." Financing became available for the mechanization of agriculture, and a trend increase in productivity in agriculture followed. The ability to fitiance investment transformed agriculture.
Big govemment sets fioors to aggregate profit flows. The success of business in the era after World War II was assured by rigging the game in favor of business profits. For a modem capitalist economy to be able to avoid debt deflations, and therefore great depressions, govemments need to be able to nm deficits when the incentive to invest by the business sector is compromised.
Economic Policy in an Age of Heightened Uncertainty
Now that for the foreseeable future the entire world can be expected to be capitalist, there is a need to understand that there is not one unique type of capitalism. As a society, we are fiee to choose the type we want.
I accept Henry Simons's view that the aim of economic policy is not nanowly economic. The aim of policy is to assure that the economic prereqtiisites for sustaining the civil and civilized standards of an open liberal society exist. If amplified uncertainty, extremes of income distribution, and social inequahty attenuate the economic underpinnings of democracy, then the market behavior that creates these conditions should be constrained. If it is necessary to give up a bit of market efficiency, or a bit of aggregate income, in order to contain democracy-threatetiing uncertainty, then so be it. In particular, there is need to supplement private incomes with socially provided incomes so that civility and civic responsibility are promoted.
Even as workers on the job realize that they are becoming ever more productive their price-level-deflated wage income is falling. The "goods" and "services" that they receive independently of what their private incomes purchase are also deteriorating.
The gross national products of the rich nations (the United States, Canada, the core countries ofthe Economic Union, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) are now so high that the continued existence of poverty is evidence of a failure to utiderstand the way in wliich capitalist economies operate and of a failure of will to make better those things that can be made better. There is no shortfall of economic capacity to end private poverty and public sqtialor. The possibilities that this immense richness opens need to be utiderstood.
Private money incomes in the form of wages, salaries, dividends, interest and transfer payments are not the sole source of incomes. We receive some of our "income" in the form of goods and services that we pay for with our disposable private money incomes; other parts are independent of our private incomes. These other dimensions are ambience incomes and services rendered to all independent of income. Just as the rich man and the poor man were free to sleep under the bridges of Paris, so the rich and the poor are free to enjoy or suffer firom the loss of safe streets.
In a world of increased wealth and income, where our common heritage of knowledge has made the potential for satisfactory life so much greater than in earlier ages, the need for community has made the universal provision of high-level health care and education necessary. Thus, there is much that can be best provided by an expanded govemment sector, whether the provider is the locality, the state or the nation. Wide disparities in personal incomes and wealth are compatible with a well-fimctioning society, as long as ambience, health care, and education incomes are available and open to all.
Our rich economy has ample available resources for investment in people and in the material infrastmcture of society. The question is not whether resources are available, but of a willingness to mobilize these resources by taxing and borrowing for public projects. Poverty in the United States is due to an imwillingness to tax. Welfare, in the form of aid to families with dependent children, exists because it is the cheapest way, short of a policy to let them die, of taking care of the population in want. Foster homes, orphanages, and guaranteed work for parents are all more expensive. Full employment is the civilized and humane way of getting rid of welfare as we have known it, but the achievement of a flilly employed economy requires a larger and more innovative govemment sector.
The impact of money market capitalism has heightened uncertainty. The wider spread of uncertainty can be offset if there is a willingness of the community to pay a price in the form of a minor "load" on efficiency. Institutional innovations that help offset the impact of uncertainty are needed as the losers in the gambles imposed by uncertainty can become alienated and become potential recruits for an alternative to democracy.
Full employment is a way of attenuating uncertainty. The tradeoff between the full employment and inflation of the 1960s and 1970s was a result of the particular institutional structure of the time. Once President Reagan broke the air controllers' strike, the tradeoff collapsed. Full employment requires special employment programs of the federal, state, and local govemments. The New Deal programs that provided income in exchange for work that led to community building-the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the National Youth Administration-need to be reconsidered as the basis for social policy in the United States.
The primary interest of the govemment of a nation-state is the well-being of its populace. The smart govenunent that offsets the aggravated uncertainty associated with money manager capitalism will need adequate resources to support activities and to validate the govemment debt that accumtilates as contracyclical and even longer-term deficits occur.
Government debt, like any other debt, has to be validated by revenues. A tax system adequate to support govemment employment and resource-creating activities is needed. The explosion of the govemment debt relative to gross domestic product over the 12 years of the Reagan-Bush administrations was largely due to an irresponsible fiscal policy that undermined the revenue system even as it did not reduce govemment spending. In the present circumstances, a role of tax policy is to assure that a downward trend in the ratio of the federal debt to gross domestic product is maintained, so that over a span of years the ratio of debt to income is lowered from the present 65 percent to about 50 percent.
One feature of the revenue system should be a value added tax, and another a transformation of the current income tax into a progressive consumption tax that has broad bands and a large per-person deduction.
Value added in production or distribution is equal to the value added by the services of labor and by the services of the capital assets. The convention is that the tax is added onto the landed price of imports and rebated from the price of exports: the value added tax is a backdoor tariff and export subsidy. A value added tax would have the sales value of im]X)rted and of domestic goods cover the social overhead of the economy. The United States already has a peculiar value added tax in the form of the employer's contribution for Social Security. However, this tax does not have the add-on and rebate provisions of the value added tax.
A flat tax uses a large per-person exemption to tum a constant rate into a moderately progressive result: a better result is achieved if the fiat tax is modified by surtaxes on higher incomes. If the fiat rate is 20 percent on the first $100,000 and 22 percent on income between $100,000 and $500,000, 25 percent on income between $500,000 and $2,000,000, and 30 percent on incomes of more than $2,000,000 a better result is achieved than by the simplistic fiat tax.
Each economic unit has an income and manages a portfolio. In various ways, we allow payments to the portfolio out of incomes to be exempt from taxes. If we generabze such exemptions, the income tax is transformed into a cotisumption tax. Furthermore we do not pay capital gains taxes on the capital gains that a pension fund makes. The capital gains that accrue over time are taxed when the fund pays out accumtilations and "contributiotis" to finance consumption. We already have compromised the income tax in the direction of a consumption tax.
During the 1992 election campaign, Clinton advocated a network of community development banks. The idea takes on increasing importance because of the heightened uncertainty due to money market capitalism. The attractiveness of small and even tnicro businesses increases with the uncertainty attached to jobs with firms that are listed and whose future is dependent upon the vagaries of money managers' evaluation. Community development banks should be set up as local holding companies and should incorporate an investment banking division [Minsky et al. 1993] .
Conclusion
Macroeconotnic theory is in flux: the need to accommodate uncertainty has moved the new classical economics toward the economics of Keynes. With the recognition of uncertainty as a deep attribute of real-world economies the simplistic propositions of laissez-faire no longer hold. Economies with the financial system of modern capitalism can implode, as happened between 1929-33.
The big govemments and the relatively unconstrained central banks of the main capitalist countries have prevented any serious approxitnation to 1929-33 in the years since World War II, although the perfomiance of the main capitalist economies has deteriorated in the past quarter century when compared to the standard set in the earlier quarter century.
There is a need for rethinking the system of intervention in capitalist economies that evolved out of the New Deal. In particular, there is a need to make full employment the main goal of economic policy. A full employment economy is supportive of democracy whereas an economy based on transfer payments suppwrts resentment. 
